

CHAPTER 8

Cultural translation

Localization theory came from industry and has incorporated elements of the equivalence paradigm. At roughly the same time, a significant number of theories have been heading in precisely the opposite direction. This chapter looks at approaches that use the word “translation” but do not refer to translations as finite texts. Instead, translation is seen as a general activity of communication between cultural groups. This broad concept of “cultural translation” can be used to address problems in postmodern sociology, postcolonialism, migration, cultural hybridity, and much else.

The main points in this chapter are:

- **“Cultural translation” can be understood as a process in which there is no start text and usually no fixed target text. The focus is on cultural processes rather than products.**
- **The prime cause of cultural translation is the movement of people (subjects) rather than the movement of texts (objects).**
- **The concepts associated with cultural translation can complement other paradigms by drawing attention to the intermediary position of the translator, the cultural hybridity that can characterize that position, the cross-cultural movements that form the places where translators work, and the problematic nature of the cultural borders crossed by all translations.**
- **There have been prior calls for wider forms of Translation Studies, and for close attention to the cultural effects of translation.**
- **Cultural translation can draw on several wide notions of translation, particularly as developed in 1) social anthropology, where the task of the ethnographer is to describe the foreign culture, 2) actor-network theory (“translation sociology”), where the interactions that form networks are seen as translations, and 3) sociologies that study communication between groups in complex, fragmented societies, particularly those shaped by migration.**

The paradigm thus helps us think about a globalizing world in which “start” and “target” sides are neither stable nor entirely separate.

8.1 A NEW PARADIGM?

The New Centennial Review, which added the “new” part of its name in 2001, opens its programmatic statement as follows:

The journal recognizes that the language of the Americas is translation, and that questions of translation, dialogue, and border crossings (linguistic, cultural, national, and the like) are necessary for rethinking the foundations and limits of the Americas.

This use of “translation” is difficult to situate in terms of the paradigms I have looked at so far. How can a whole language be translation? How can two continents have just one language? There seems to be no equivalence involved, no goal-oriented communicative activity, no texts or even translators, and nothing definite enough for anyone to be uncertain about it. What is meant, I suspect, is that **colonial and postcolonial processes** have displaced and mixed languages, and this displacement and mixing are somehow related to translation. But to call all of that “translation” sounds willfully metaphorical. It is “as if” every discourse were the result of a translation, “as if” all the moving people were translators, and “as if” there were a mode of communication available to all. The perplexity behind these questions suggests the passage to a new paradigm.

Numerous examples can be found of “translation” being used in this way. The purpose of this chapter is to survey them to see if they might indeed be parts of a paradigm. I will start from the basics of postcolonial theory, from a reading of the influential theorist Homi Bhabha. This will map out a sense of “cultural translation.” I will then step back and consider previous calls for wider forms of Translation Studies, most of them direct extensions of the paradigms we have seen in this book. The survey then considers ethnography (where the term “cultural translation” was first used), postmodern sociology, and a little psychoanalysis. Can all these things constitute just one paradigm? Should the Western translation form be extended in all these directions? The chapter will close with brief consideration of the political questions at stake.

8.2 HOMI BHABHA AND “NON-SUBSTANTIVE” TRANSLATION

The idea of “cultural translation” is most significantly presented by the Indian cultural theorist **Homi K. Bhabha** in a chapter called “How Newness Enters the World: Postmodern Space, Postcolonial Time and the Trials of Cultural Translation” (in *The Location of Culture*, 1994/2004). Part of the chapter discusses the novel *The Satanic Verses* by the Indian-born British novelist **Salman Rushdie**. Bhabha is concerned with what this kind of mixed discourse, representative of those who have migrated from the Indian sub-continent to “the West,” might mean for Western culture. He sets the stage with two possible options: either the migrant remains the same throughout the process, or they integrate into the new culture. One or the other. That kind of question is strangely reminiscent of some of the major oppositions in translation theory: should the translation keep the form of the start text, or should it function entirely as part of the new cultural setting (3.4 above)? Should localization seek “diversification” or “standardization” (7.5.6 above)? Bhabha’s use of the term “translation” might be justified because of those traditional oppositions. Nonetheless, his basic question more directly concerns fundamental dilemmas faced by migrant families,

especially in the second and third generations: for example, which languages do we use in the home? Rather than take sides on these questions, Bhabha looks at how they are dealt with (or better, performed) in Rushdie's novel. You can imagine Bhabha reading Rushdie, then commenting on other postcolonial experiences, and doing all that with reference to translation, looking for some kind of solution to the basic cultural problems of postcolonial migration. He does not, however, cite the classical oppositions I have just referred to; he turns only to Walter Benjamin's essay on translation (6.3.2 above) and Derrida's commentary on it (plus a reference to de Man). One of the difficulties of reading Bhabha is that he presupposes a working knowledge of all these texts, as professors of literature tend to assume. Another difficulty is that he invites us to think these are the only translation theorists around, as readers of this book will hopefully now not assume.

So what does "cultural translation" mean? By the time Bhabha gets to this chapter of *The Location of Culture* (1994/2004), he has accumulated quite a few uses of the term in a vague metaphorical way. He has talked about "a sense of the new as an insurgent act of cultural translation" (10), "the borderline condition of cultural translation" (11), the "process of cultural translation, showing up the hybridity of any genealogical or systematic filiation" (83), "cultural translation, hybrid sites of meaning" (234), and so on. In this chapter, a more serious attempt is made to connect with translation theory. Bhabha is remarkably uninterested in the translators of *The Satanic Verses*, even though they were the ones who bore the brunt of the *fatwā* or Islamic condemnation of the novel: Hitoshi Igarashi, the Japanese translator, was stabbed to death on July 11, 1991; two other translators of the novel, Ettore Capriolo (into Italian) and Aziz Nesin (into Turkish), survived attempted assassinations in the same years. No matter: Bhabha is more concerned with the novel itself as a kind of translation. What set off the *fatwā* he claims, is the way the novel implicitly translates the sacred into the profane: the name "Mahomed" becomes "Mahound," and the prostitutes are named after wives of the prophet. Those examples do indeed look like translations; the blasphemy can fairly be described as "a transgressive act of cultural translation"; there is thus some substance to the claim that a certain kind of cross-cultural writing can be translational. Then again, what kind of theorization can allow those few words to become representative of whole genres of discourse?

What Bhabha takes from translation theory is not any great binary opposition (the dilemmas of migration present plenty of those already) but the notion of **untranslatability**, found in Walter Benjamin's passing claim that "translations themselves are untranslatable" (Benjamin 1923/1977: 61; 6.3.2 above). Benjamin actually talks about this untranslatability as being due to the "all too great fleetingness [*Flüchtigkeit*] with which meaning attaches to translations" (1923/1977: 61), and I prefer to see this as referring to the momentary subjective position of the translator (6.3.2 above). Bhabha nevertheless wants nothing of this "fleetingness" (and thereby forgoes numerous possible puns on *Flüchtling* as a "displaced person," a "refugee," an "escapee"). For him, that untranslatable quality of translations is instead a point of **resistance**, a negation of complete integration, and a **will to survival** found in the subjectivity of the migrant. As such, it presents a way out of the binary dilemmas. And this, I suspect, is the great attraction of translation as a metaphor or way of thinking, here and throughout the whole of Cultural Studies: it can cut across binarisms.

To associate resistance with survival, however, Bhabha has to mix this "untranslatability" with the part of Benjamin's essay that talks about translations as extending the life of the original. Benjamin does indeed say that translations give the original an "**after-life**"

(*Fortleben*, “prolonged life”), which, says Benjamin, “could not be so called if it were not the transformation and renewal of a living thing, the original is changed” (Benjamin 1923/2012: 77). Now, to get from “after-life” to “survival,” you have to have read Derrida’s commentary in *The Ear of the Other* (1982/1985: 122–3), where the claim is made that 1) Benjamin uses the terms *Überleben* and *Fortleben* (does Derrida miss *Nachleben*?) interchangeably to mean “living on,” and 2) the one French term *survivre* (“survive,” but literally “on-live,” “to live on”) translates both Benjamin’s terms (the topic is also developed in Derrida 1979, 1985). Benjamin’s “prolonged life” (*Fortleben/Nachleben*) can thus become “survival” (*Überleben, survie*) in the eyes of Bhabha, and both are related to being on, or in, the problematic border between life and death. In this chicane of interlingual interpretations, a few nuances have been shaved off, with alarming certitude: what for Benjamin was “fleeting” has become “resistance;” what was a discussion of *texts* in Benjamin and Derrida has become an explanation of *people*; what was an issue of *languages* has become a concern within *just one language* (Bhabha writes as a professor of English discussing a novel written in English); what was the border between life and death for Derrida has become the cultural borders of migration; and what was generally a theory of translation as linguistic transformation has now become a struggle for new cultural identities. In short, the previous theorization of translation has been invested in one word (“survival”) and applied to an entirely new context. Bhabha knits this together as follows:

If hybridity is heresy, then to blaspheme is to dream. To dream not of the past or present, nor the continuous present; it is not the nostalgic dream of tradition, nor the Utopian dream of modern progress; it is the dream of translation as “survival,” as Derrida translates the “time” of Benjamin’s concept of the after-life of translation, as *sur-vivre*, the act of living on borderlines. Rushdie translates this into the migrant’s dream of survival; an *initiatory* interstices [*sic*]; an empowering condition of hybridity; an emergence that turns “return” into reinscription or re-description; an iteration that is not belated, but ironic and insurgent.

(Bhabha 1994/2004: 324)

There is no attempt here to relate the notion of survival to anything in the equivalence or purpose paradigms of translation, so perhaps I should not insist too much on Rushdie’s use of blasphemous names as actual translations. In Bhabha’s reading, there is no particular start text, no particular target, no mission to accomplish anything beyond “resistance.” All those things (start, target, purpose, life-and-death) surely belong more to the *fatwā* as a flying arrow destined to punish mistranslations. However, if Rushdie’s resistance is indeed a kind of translation, it must also recognize the reading embedded in the *fatwā* even if only to contest it. Indeed, it is only through negation of that reading that the object of cultural translation can properly be described as “**non-substantive translation**,” as Bhabha himself is reported as calling it (in Trivedi 2007: 286). What we have, though, looks more like a diffuse kind of longing (“to dream”) that comes from the position of a translator, situated on or perhaps in the borders between cultures, defined by **cultural hybridity**. From that perspective, something of Benjamin’s “fleetingness” can then be recuperated when Bhabha refers to the indeterminacy of the hybrid: “The focus is on making the linkages through the unstable elements of literature and life—the dangerous tryst with the ‘untranslatable’—rather than arriving at ready-made names” (Bhabha 1994/2004: 325). This is generalized in the formula: “Translation is the performative nature of cultural communication”

(1994/2004: 326), which can perhaps only be understood in terms of Bhabha's closing winks to all kind of borders between and within cultures, not just those due to migration but also those of all minority cultures: Bhabha mentions feminism, gay and lesbian writings, and the "Irish question." Wherever borders are crossed, cultural translation may result.

As a piece of theorizing, Bhabha's text does not choose between the alternatives it presents. Should the migrants remain unchanged, or should they integrate? What should be their home languages? How should mainstream Western culture react to cultural hybridity? Such questions are not solved; they are dissolved. Bhabha simply points to this space between, elsewhere termed the "third space," where the terms of these questions are enacted. Once you see the workings of that space, the questions no longer need any kind of "yes" or "no" answer.

The sense of "translation" here is far wider than the texts we call translations. This theoretical approach is quite different from the descriptive studies that look at the way translations have been carried out in colonial and postcolonial contexts. Bhabha is not talking about a particular set of translations, but about a different sense of translation.

You can perhaps now understand why the American journal bravely declared that "the language of the Americas is translation." In fact, such claims might now be rather tame. In a world where major demographic movements have undermined categories like "a society," "a language," "a culture," or "a nation," any serious study requires new terms to describe its objects. "Translation" is one of those convenient terms, but so too is "emergence" (things are emerging and submerging in history), "hybridity" (extending Bhabha, every cultural object is a hybrid), "complexity" (there is no one-to-one causation), and "minoritization" (which would recuperate the role of elements excluded by the supposition or imposition of a linguistic or cultural "system"). Translation is only one of a number of terms, but it has become a popular one. And Bhabha is only one of a number of theorists working in this field, but he is perhaps the most influential.

Does this theorizing have anything to offer the other paradigms of translation theory? One might be tempted to dismiss Bhabha as no more than a set of vague opinions, presented in the form of fashionable metaphors. At the same time, if you do accept this as a paradigm of translation theory, it reveals some aspects that have been ignored or sidelined by the other paradigms:

- This view of translation is from the **perspective of a (figurative) translator**, not translations. No other paradigm, except perhaps parts of *Skopos* theory, has talked about the position of someone who produces language from the "between space" of languages and cultures (one could also talk about "overlaps").
- The focus on **hybridity** has something to say about the general position of translators, who by definition know two languages and probably at least two cultures, and it might say something basic about the effects that translation has on cultures, opening them to other cultures. Bhabha does not say that translations are hybrid; he locates a translatory discourse that enacts hybridity.
- The link with migration highlights the way translation ensues from **material movements**. Bhabha would not want his view of translation to be bound to any materialist determinism. Nonetheless, the framing of translation by the material movement of people seems not to have been the focus of any other paradigm.
- Bhabha sees that translatorial movements traverse **previously established borders** and thereby question them. No other paradigm has so vigorously raised the problem

of the two-side border figured by translations (see 3.5 above), although the uncertainty paradigm can certainly question the way borders produce illusory oppositions.

These are all valid points; they indicate important blind-spots in the other paradigms; they justify calling “cultural translation” a new paradigm. Perhaps more important, these points concern quite profound problems that ensue from the increasingly fragmented nature of our societies and the numerous mixes of our cultures, not all of which are due to migration (communication technologies also play a powerful role). Further, these points are raised in a way that is a little different from what we have seen in the uncertainty paradigm. Whereas Benjamin and Derrida, for example, were ultimately engaged in reading and translating *texts*, attempting to bring out multiple potential meanings, Bhabha makes rather more programmatic statements about the world, without much heed for second thoughts or clear referents (e.g. “Rushdie translates this into the migrant’s dream of survival”). Rather than a hermeneutics of texts, “cultural translation” has become a way of talking about the world.

Now for some down-to-earth questions: Do we really have to go through Rushdie, Benjamin, and Derrida to reach the tenets of “cultural translation”? Or have all these things been said before, in different places, from different perspectives? And are they being said in other places as well, as different but similar responses to the underlying phenomena of globalization?

Separating the terms

After Bhabha, the term “cultural translation” might be associated with material movement, the position of the translator, cultural hybridity, the crossing of borders, and border zones as a “third space.” As such, the term is not to be confused with several formulations that sound similar but mean different things. I attempt to define the differences:

- **Cultural translation (Bhabha):** In the sense of Bhabha (1994/2004), a set of discourses that enact hybridity by crossing cultural borders, revealing the intermediary positions of (figurative) translators. This is the most general sense, the one I am using the term to describe a paradigm.
- **Cultural translation (ethnography):** In the tradition of British social anthropology, a view of ethnography as the description of a foreign culture. That is, the ethnographer translates the foreign culture into an (English-language) ethnographic description.
- **Cultural turn:** A term proposed by Snell-Hornby (1990) and legitimated by Lefevere and Bassnett (1990) whereby Translation Studies should focus on the cultural effects of translations. For Snell-Hornby, the “translation unit” (the unit taken for each analysis) should move from the text to the culture. The thrust of this view does not challenge traditional uses of the term “translation” and has long been a part of the intellectual background of the descriptive paradigm. Other versions see the “turn” as the use of cultural variables to explain translations, which has also long been part of the descriptive paradigm.
- **Translation culture (Übersetzungskultur):** Term used by the Göttingen group (see Frank 1989) to describe the cultural norms governing translations within a target system, on the model of *Esskultur*, which would describe the way a certain

society eats (including all the Chinese and Indian restaurants in Germany, for example). This concept applies to what a society does with translations and expects of them; it does not challenge traditional definitions of translations and it does not focus on the translator. The concept works within the descriptive paradigm.

- **Translation culture** (*Translationskultur*): Defined by Erich Prunč as a “variable set of norms, conventions and expectations which frame the behavior of all interactants in the field of translation” (Prunč 2000: 59; cf. Pöchhacker 2001, who renders the term as “translation standards”), considered to be a “historically developed subsystem of a culture” (Prunč 1997: 107). This concept focuses on translators and associated social actors, but strangely does not place them near any border. Developed with clear sympathies with *Skopos* theory, the concept would like to be descriptive.
- **Cultural Studies**: A diffuse set of academic studies that adopt a critical and theorizing approach to cultural phenomena in general, emphasizing heterogeneity, hybridity, and the critique of power. Bhabha’s postcolonial use of “cultural translation” fits in with this frame. The researcher is generally implicated in the object under study (as is the case in Bhabha).
- **Culture Research**: The term preferred by Even-Zohar for the study of the way cultures develop, interact, and die. On this view, cultures are seen as systems that need transfer (exchange) for their maintenance of energy and thus survival. The researcher seeks to adopt an objective stance.
- **Professional interculture**: A cultural place where people combine elements of more than one primary culture in order to carry out crosscultural communication. For Pym (2004a), professional intercultures are the places where the borders between primary cultures are defined. They include most of the situations in which translators work. This concept is sociological.

8.3 TRANSLATION WITHOUT TRANSLATIONS: CALLS FOR A WIDER DISCIPLINE

“Cultural translation” moves beyond translations as restricted (written or spoken) texts; its concern is with general cultural processes rather than finite linguistic products. This is the sense of “translation without translations.” Was this wider view invented by Bhabha in 1994? Probably not. Previous paradigms have envisaged projects for the study of translation without translations, albeit without undoing the concept of “a translation” (product) as such. Here I recall just a few of those projects.

8.3.1 Mediation (*Sprachmittlung*)

The term *Sprachmittler* (language mediator) has long been present in German as a superordinate for translators and interpreters (cf. Pöchhacker 2006: 217). *Sprachmittlung* (language mediation) was used as a general term for all modes of cross-language communication in the Leipzig school (cf. Kade 1968, 1977). In the Leipzig system, “mediation”

would be the general term for everything that can be done to communicate between languages, while “translation” and “interpreting” would be specific forms that are constrained by equivalence. This did not mean there were modes of translation that escaped from equivalence constraints, but it did mean that translation should be studied within a frame wider than equivalence.

In the mid-1980s, the *Skopos* theory of translation (see 4.3 above) relaxed the criterion of equivalence, using “translational action” as a synonym for “mediated cross-language communication.” Holz-Mänttari (1984) was aware that translators do more than translate (they can give advice as to when not to translate, for example, or they can write new texts on command), so she proposed to study the entire range of their activity.

At the same time, however, the term “mediation” took on a slightly different meaning in research on bilingualism (cf. Pöchhacker 2006: 217). Knapp and Knapp-Potthoff (1985) used the term *Sprachmitteln* (“linguistic mediating”) to describe the performances of untrained bilinguals in face-to-face communication. This is what Translation Studies had been calling “natural translation” (after Harris 1976). German experts in second-language acquisition now refer to “mediation” as the full range of what speakers can do with two languages, ranging from giving the gist of a foreign text or indicating street directions right through to translation in the narrowest of senses. The term “mediation” features prominently in this sense in the *Common European Framework of Reference for Languages* (Council of Europe 2001), where it is referred to as the **fifth main language skill**, alongside speaking, listening, writing, and reading (Council of Europe 2001).

This means that the term “translation” has gained a very restricted (and restrictive) sense in Bilingualism Studies and Language Education, at the same time as it has become virtually synonymous with “mediation” in German-language Translation Studies. Between these two meanings, translation activities have traditionally been squeezed out of additional-language classes, sometimes because translation is somehow not considered a “communicative activity.”

If the case can be made that “translation” and “mediation” are effectively the same thing, then the result will not only be a wider and more diverse field of inquiry, but also a conceptual basis for the return of dynamic translation activities to the language classroom. There is more to this than confusion over words.

At the moment, many language educationists in Germany use “mediation” to mean “translation without translations.”

8.3.2 Jakobson and semiosis

When discussing the development of hermeneutics within the uncertainty paradigm (6.4.6), I mentioned **Roman Jakobson's** statement that “the meaning of any linguistic sign is its translation into some further, alternative sign” (1959/2012: 127). This is the key point of a theory of **semiosis**, where **meaning is constantly created by interpretations** and is thus never a fixed thing that could be objectified and transferred. As I noted, rather than represent a previous meaning, translation would be the active *production* of meaning. That was in 1959, from within a linguistics that at that stage wanted to become semiotics, the wider study of all kinds of signs.

Jakobson's 1959 paper attempts to draw out some of the consequences of semiosis. One of those consequences is his list of three kinds of translation, which he claims can be

“intralingual” (i.e. any rewording within the one language), “interlingual” (rewording between languages), or “intersemiotic” (interpretation between different sign systems, as when a piece of music interprets a poem). Once you decide that translation is a process rather than a product, you can find evidence of that process virtually everywhere. Any use of language (or semiotic system) that rewords or reworks any other piece of language (or semiotic system) can be seen as the result of a translational process. And since languages are based precisely on the repetition of utterances in different situations, producing different but related meanings, just as all texts are made meaningful by intertextuality, **all language use can be seen as translation**. The consequences of this view are perhaps far wider and more revolutionary than what Bhabha has to say.

Perhaps the most eloquent enactment of Jakobson’s semiosis is to be found in the French philosopher **Michel Serres**. His book *La Traduction* (1974) considers the ways different sciences translate concepts from each other: how philosophy is translated from formal languages, how painting can translate physics (Turner translates primitive thermodynamics), and how literature translates religion (Faulkner translates the Bible). Serres does not claim to be studying any set of texts called translations; he is more interested in translation as a process of communication between domains otherwise thought to be separate. His practice of “general translation” would become important for French sociology (see 8.5 below).

Jakobson, however, did not want to travel too far down that path. His typology retains the notion of “translation proper” for “interlingual translation,” and his description of “intersemiotic translation” privileges verbal signs (like those of “translation proper”) as the point of departure. In this, he was preceded by the Danish semiotician **Louis Hjelmslev**, whose view of intersemiotic translation was similarly directional:

In practice, a language is a semiotic into which all other semiotics may be translated—both all other languages and all other conceivable semiotic structures. This translatability rests on the fact that all languages, and they alone, are in a position to form any purport whatsoever.

(Hjelmslev 1943/1963: 109)

Similarly, the Italian theorist **Umberto Eco** (2001) classified translatory movements between semiotic systems, at the same time as he privileged the place of “translation proper” as a finite textual product of interlingual movements (5.4.6 above). Jakobson and Eco could both envisage a wide conceptual space for “translation without translations,” yet they did not want to throw away or belittle the translations that professional translators do.

Types of translation without translations?

Roman Jakobson recognizes three kinds of translation (1959/2012: 127):

- *Intralingual translation* or rewording is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language.
- *Interlingual translation* or translation proper is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language.
- *Intersemiotic translation* or transmutation is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.

These categories can be compared with the forms Umberto Eco describes for the interpretant (1977: 70):

- An equivalent sign in another semiotic system (a drawing of a dog corresponds to the word dog).
- An index directed to a single object (smoke signifies the existence of a fire).
- A definition in the same system (*salt* signifies *sodium chloride*).
- An emotive association which acquires the value of an established connotation (*dog* signifies “fidelity”).
- A “translation into another language,” or substitution by a synonym.

8.3.3 Even-Zohar’s call for transfer theory

Jakobson’s 1959 paper is one of the starting points for Itamar Even-Zohar’s call to extend the scope of Translation Studies. Since all systems are heterogeneous and dynamic, Even-Zohar proposes there are always movements of “textual models” from one to another, and translation is only one type of such movements. We should thus be studying all kinds of transfer:

Some people would take this as a proposal to liquidate translation studies. I think the implication is quite the opposite: through a larger context, it will become even clearer that “translation” is not a marginal procedure of cultural systems. Secondly, the larger context will help us identify the really particular in translation. Thirdly, it will change our conception of the translated text in such a way that we may perhaps be liberated from certain postulated criteria. And fourthly, it may help us isolate what ‘translational procedures’ consist of.

(Even-Zohar 1990a: 74)

The term “transfer” here means that a textual model from one system is not just put into another, it is *integrated* into the relations of the host system and thereby undergoes and generates change. Thus “transfer [...] is correlated with transformation” (Even-Zohar 1990b: 20). This maps out a kind of study in which there are many movements between systems, only some of which occur as translations, and the same kinds of movements are crossing borders *within* systems as well.

This extension is comparable to Bhabha’s “cultural translation,” except that:

- 1 What is transferred here is limited to “textual models” (although Even-Zohar’s more recent work refers to “goods,” “technologies,” and “ideational energy”).
- 2 In these formulations there is no particular focus on the human element, on the position and role of the mediators, and thus no attention to anything like a “third space.”
- 3 As a consequence, the model remains one of systems separated by borders, no matter how many borders (and thus sub-systems) there may be within each system.
- 4 As a further consequence, the human researcher remains clearly external to the systems under investigation, with all the trappings of scientific discourse.

Perhaps because of these choices, Even-Zohar's proposed "transfer theory" has had little effect on the general development of translation theory. Many of those who have opened the paths of "cultural translation" would perhaps be surprised at the extent to which Even-Zohar addressed similar problems well before them. I hasten to add that Even-Zohar's *Ideational Labor and the Production of Social Energy* (2008) does show greater interest in human intermediaries, and indeed sees transfer as necessary for cultural survival, not in Bhabha's sense of worrying about the identity of Salman Rushdie, but with respect to whole cultures disappearing for want of transfers from other cultures. That is a rather more perturbing sense of survival.

8.4 ETHNOGRAPHY AS TRANSLATION

None of the above approaches uses the term "cultural translation"; all of them can be associated with other paradigms of translation theory; none of them (barring cautious winks to Jakobson) is mentioned by the theorists of cultural translation. A more powerful antecedent, however, can be found in ethnology or "social anthropology," which is where the term "cultural translation" seems to have been coined. How might this relate to the new paradigm?

The basic idea here is that when ethnologists set out to describe distant cultures (thus technically becoming "ethnographers," writers of descriptions), they are translating the cultures into their own professional language. In some cases the translations are remarkably like the traditional cases dealt with in the equivalence paradigm: they might concern a cultural concept, a place name, or a value-laden phrase. In other instances, however, they are dealing with issues that have more to do with the philosophy and ethics of crosscultural discourse. In very basic terms, the ethnographer can neither suppose radical cultural difference (in which case no description or understanding would be possible) nor complete sameness (in which case no one would need the description). In between those two poles, the term "translation" is used.

The earlier Western anthropologists were generally unaware of their descriptions being translations, since they tended to assume that their own language was able to describe adequately whatever they found (see Rubel and Rosman 2003). **Talal Asad** (1986) notes that in the British tradition the task of social anthropology has been described as a kind of "translation" since the 1950s. Asad goes back to Walter Benjamin (he would probably have been more sure-footed going to Schleiermacher) in order to argue that good translations show the structure and nature of the foreign culture; he thus announces a "call to transform a language in order to translate the coherence of the original" (Asad 1986: 157), especially in situations where there is a pronounced asymmetry in the power relations between the languages involved.

Note that the term "cultural translation" here fundamentally means the **translation of a culture**, and translation theory (not much more than Benjamin) is being used in an argument about how this should be done. This is not quite the same sense as we have found in Bhabha, where "cultural translation" is more closely related to the problematics of hybridity and border-crossing. Asad's argument about a "better" mode of translation certainly pushes "cultural translation" toward a more hybrid kind of space, opening the more powerful language to those of the less powerful cultures being described. One hesitates, however, to equate Bhabha's usage of "cultural translation" with this simpler and more traditional sense of "describing other cultures."

Some translation theorists have taken due note of the way the term “translation” has been used in ethnography. **Wolf** (1997) allows that this is a kind of translation, but she notes that ethnographers are typically engaged in a two-stage mode of work, first interpreting the spoken discourse of informants, then adapting that interpretation for consumption in the dominant culture. Two-stage work involving oral then written mediation can of course be found in mainstream translation history (the practice was noted in Hispania in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries). The prime difference is that the ethnographer does not usually have a materially fixed text to start from. In this sense, ethnographic translation might yet fit under Bhabha’s “non-substantive translation.”

Some rather more interesting things have been said either within the ethnographic frame or with reference to it. **James Clifford** (especially 1997) has elaborated an approach in which **travel** becomes the prime means of contact between cultures, configuring the spaces in which cultural translation is carried out. Within literary hermeneutics, this kind of approach is seen as reducing the asymmetries of intercultural alterity and risking a tendency toward sameness (see, for example, the essays in Budick and Lser 1996, where translation theory returns to various prescriptive stances). Clifford’s line of thought nevertheless remains extremely suggestive for future research. The way translations represent cultures through travel and for travelers is a huge area requiring new forms of theorization (as in Cronin 2000, 2003).

A position closer to Bhabha is announced by **Wolfgang Iser**, who sees translation as a key concept not just for “the encounter between cultures” (1994: 5) but also for interactions within cultures. Iser uses the notion of **untranslatability** not as the resistance of the migrant, as it is in Bhabha, but as the use of cultural difference to change the way descriptions are produced. In translation, says Iser, “foreign culture is not simply subsumed under one’s own frame of reference; instead, the very frame is subjected to alterations in order to accommodate what does not fit” (1994: 5).

At this level, the references to ethnography as translation enter general debates about how different cultures should interrelate, and any sense of translations as a specific class of texts has been lost.

8.5 TRANSLATION SOCIOLOGY

I have mentioned the work of Michel Serres as a mode of “generalized translation.” Serres’ work influenced a group of French ethnographers of science, notably **Michel Callon** and **Bruno Latour**, who developed what they term a “*sociologie de la traduction*” (cf. Akrich *et al.* 2006), also known as “**actor-network theory**.” I render this as “**translation sociology**” rather than “the sociology of translation” because, for me, the “translation” part refers to the *method of analysis* rather than to the object under analysis (although the theory would reject this binary distinction). The term “the sociology of translation” has nevertheless been used in English by these same sociologists (for example in Callon 1986). These researchers are not at all concerned with explaining interlingual translations, and they are not particularly interested in the historical and ethical issues of “cultural translation” in Bhabha’s sense. They have instead been using a model of translation to explain the way networks are formed between social actors, particularly with respect to power relations involving science.

For example, **Michel Callon** (1986), in a seminal paper, studies the way marine biologists sought to stop the decline in a population of scallops by influencing the social

groups involved. This involved not just forming networks, but also producing and extending social discourses on the problem. At each stage in the analysis, from the actions of the scallops to those of the fishermen, of the scientists and indeed of the sociologist, there is a common process by which one actor or group is taken to represent (or speak on behalf of) others. The result is a rather poetic leveling out where the one process (“translation”) applies to all, including the scallops. This is a key point, and one that should be of interest to translation theory. Translation, for Callon, is the process by which one person or group says things that are taken to be “on behalf of” or to “stand for” another person or group. That might simply be another version of Jakobson’s view of linguistic meaning, of semiosis, except that in this case the representation process is seen as the formation of social power. Here, for another example, are Callon and Latour on something a little more general than scallops, namely the **social contract** sought by the seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes:

The social contract is only a particular instance of the more general phenomenon known as translation. By “translation” we mean the set of negotiations, intrigues, acts of persuasion, calculations, acts of violence by which an actor or a force accords or allows itself to be accorded the authority to speak or to act in the name of another actor or force: “your interests are our interests,” “do what I want,” “you cannot succeed without me.” As soon as an actor says “we,” he or she translates other actors into a single aspiration [*volonté*] of which she or he becomes the master or spokesperson.

(Callon and Latour 1981/2006: 12–13; my translation)

The word “translation” in this passage has a footnote referring to Serres 1974 and Callon 1975.

Seen in these terms, translation becomes the basic building block of social relations, and thereby of societies, the object of sociology. This sociology is exceptional in that it tries *not* to assume any pre-existing categories or boundaries. It would simply follow the translations, the budding nodes in networks, in order to observe the actual institution of any borders. There is no need to question *what* is being translated. Indeed, for Bruno Latour (1984/1988: 167), “[n]othing is, by itself, either knowable or unknowable, sayable or unsayable, near or far. Everything is translated.” Similarly, there is no “society or social realm,” only translators who generate “traceable associations” (Latour 2005: 108). Translation becomes the process through which we form social relations.

With respect to the theory of translations as texts, and indeed within the paradigm of cultural translation, translation sociology has appeal on several grounds:

- 1 The **refusal to recognize pre-established social and cultural boundaries** is essentially what the discourses of cultural translation would be doing when they position themselves in the in-between space of cultures. Translation sociology forces the borders to manifest themselves, as indeed would the hybrid discourses of cultural translation.
- 2 The emphasis on **translation as the formation of power relations** clearly also fits in with postcolonial problematics, particularly as far as problems of agency and relations between cultural groups are concerned.
- 3 If the building block of power relations is the process by which one social actor presumes to or is made to “**speak on behalf of another**,” is this not precisely what all

translations are presumed or made to do? This might pose the interesting question of why not all translators accrue the social power presumably gained by those who presume to speak on behalf of science.

- 4 The **networks** in which translators tend to work are so small, so intercultural and so marked by cultural hybridity that they are ill-served by the classical sociologies of societies or indeed sociologies of systems (as in Luhmann) and structurally defined social groups (as in Bourdieu). Translation sociology would seem well suited to such an object, as might concepts such as “micro-cosmopolitanism” (Cronin 2006).
- 5 The recognition that **networks extend to and include the sociologist** (or any other analyst) fits in not only with the general sense of involvement found in the theorists of cultural translation, but also with action research (largely influencing the field of translator education) and indeed psychoanalytical approaches.

This does not mean that translation sociology is automatically a part of the paradigm of cultural translation. There are many other things going on. I submit, however, that the work of Callon and Latour has responded to an increasing fragmentation of social categories, just as theorists like Bhabha have done from other perspectives. Some attempts have been made to apply translation sociology to the networks in which translators operate (e.g. Buzelin 2007), and much more can be done. It would be a sad error, however, to think that translation sociology should be applied to professional translators simply because the term “translation” appears in both. The word has very different meanings in the two places.

A more effective connection between translation sociology and cultural translation can be found in a group of Germanic sociologists and translation theorists. For example, **Joachim Renn** (2006a, 2006b) argues that our postmodern societies are so culturally fragmented that translation is the best model of the way the different groups can communicate with each other and ensure governance. “Cultural translation” can thus be associated with the way differences are maintained and negotiated within complex societies. It may concern both institution and resistance, as well as what a more traditional systems sociology would call “boundary maintenance” (after Parsons 1951). Since this kind of cultural translation generally involves the displacements of people rather than texts, it is just a few steps from there to the view of migration itself as a form of translation (Papastergiadis 2000; Cronin 2006; Vorderobermeier and Wolf 2008), which ultimately returns us to the postcolonial frame. The work of the Germanic scholars bridges across the gaps that initially separated translation sociology of Callon and Latour from the kind of cultural translation we find in Bhabha.

8.6 SPIVAK AND THE PSYCHOANALYTICS OF TRANSLATION

One final strand should be mentioned, before a general consideration of cultural translation. Quite a few authors have explored the relations between psychoanalysis and translation, although few of them have done so to make any original contribution to translation theory as such. The general idea is that psychoanalysis concerns the use of language, translation is a use of language, so in translations we can find traces of the unconscious. Other approaches consider the terms Freud used for the workings of the unconscious (Benjamin 1992), many of which can be seen as modes of translation. This effectively places translational processes anterior to meaning formation, concurring with many of the

views held within the uncertainty paradigm. None of this particularly concerns cultural translation of the kind I have been considering in this chapter. An intriguing bridge is built, however, in the way the Indian theorist **Gayatri Spivak**, working from the psychoanalytical approach of Melanie Klein, describes a primal kind of translation:

The human infant grabs on to some one thing and then things. This grabbing (*begreifen*) of an outside indistinguishable from an inside constitutes an inside, going back and forth and coding everything into a sign-system by the thing(s) grasped. One can call this crude coding a “translation”.

(2007: 261)

Translation, in this sense, would describe the way the infant enters culture and forms subjectivity; it is spatially a dynamic by which borders are enacted. In Spivak, this sense of translation can be applied to all subsequent entries into all further cultures. Translation is thus also the movement from indigenous cultures in Australia or Bengal to standard cultures of their regions, or indeed of any of the other cultural movements involved in “cultural translation” (although Spivak does not use the term in the paper I am citing from).

Although Spivak openly avows that this is not the literal sense of the word “translation” —“a term I use not for obscurity, but because I find it indispensable” (2007: 264)—she does stretch it to include her own work as a translator of Derrida and the Bengali writer Mahasweta Devi. This is perhaps the closest we come to a psychoanalytical description of translation from the perspective of a translator:

When a translator translates from a constituted language, whose system of inscription, and permissible narratives are “her own”, this secondary act, translation in the narrow sense, as it were, is also a peculiar act of reparation—towards the language of the inside, a language in which we are “responsible”, the guilt of seeing it as one language among many.

(2007: 265)

The one primal narrative thus manages to account for the various senses of the word “translation.”

Part of the interest of Spivak’s view of translation is not just her experience as a translator but her preparedness to experiment with modes of translation that go beyond the reproduction of sentences. Her self-reflexive and informative prefaces and peritextual material (particularly in the translations of Devi) not only make the translator highly visible but inscribe the context of a wider cultural translation. Spivak’s is one of the few proposals that might relate cultural translation to the actual practice of translators.

Spivak’s message, however, is not univocal. Spivak takes issue with theories that claim translation should privilege foreignness and resistance (just as she elsewhere reclaims the right to use essentialism within deconstruction):

The toughest problem here is translation from idiom to standard, an unfashionable thing among the elite progressives, without which the abstract structures of democracy cannot be comprehended.

(2007: 274)

The democracy of Bengal requires common understanding of shared standard terms. The same might be true of democracies everywhere. And standardized languages, especially when in minority situations, are not well served by foreignizing translations. This is one of the great debates with which theories of cultural translation have not sought to engage.

8.7 “GENERALIZED TRANSLATION”

Within and beyond the above frames, there is no shortage of metaphorical uses of the word “translation.” Language is a translation of thought; writing translates speech; literature translates life; a reading translates a text; all metaphors are also translations (*metapherein* is one of the Greek terms for “translation”), and in the end, as the Lauryn Hill song puts it, “everything is everything.” The metaphors have long been present in literary theory and they are increasingly operative in cultural theory. Here I just pick at a few threads:

- Translation is the displacement of theory from one topographic location to another (for example, Miller 1995); it is the figure of intellectual nomadism, moving from discipline to discipline (for example, Vieira 2000; West 2002), but that was already in Serres.
- Translation is “a metaphor for understanding how the foreign and the familiar are inter-related in every form of cultural production” (Papastergiadis 2000: 124).
- Translation is part of all meaning production; there is no non-translation (Sallis 2002), but that proposition was already in Jakobson and Latour.
- Translation plays a key role in the transmission of values from one generation to the next, and is part of all “literary invigoration” (Brodski 2007).
- Translation is “a means of repositioning the subject in the world and in history; a means of rendering self-knowledge foreign to itself; a way of denaturalizing citizens, taking them out of the comfort zone of national space, daily ritual, and pre-given domestic arrangements” (Apter 2006: 6).
- And a long etcetera (cf. Duarte 2005).

Such generalization may be liberating and exciting to many; it could seem dissipating and meaningless to others. Let me simply note that many (although not all) of the above references are from the United States or are in tune with the development of Literary Theory and Comparative Literature in the United States. At the same time, the United States is a country with remarkably few translator-training institutions and thus with relatively little demand for the kind of translation theory developed within the equivalence or *Skopos* paradigms, and scant development of Translation Studies as envisaged in the descriptive paradigm. In terms of academic markets, if nothing else, the United States has provided a situation where the uncertainty paradigm could flourish into several modes of generalized translation.

Most of the above discourses do not actually refer to “cultural translation,” since that term has tended to propagate later. They have, however, opened huge conceptual spaces for the paradigm. Once its moorings to equivalence are severed, “translation” easily becomes a drunken boat.

8.8 FREQUENTLY HAD ARGUMENTS

The positive points of the cultural translation paradigm are roughly those we outlined with reference to Bhabha (in 8.2 above): it introduces a human dimension and sees translation from the perspective of the (figurative) translator; it concerns translation as a cultural process rather than a textual product; its focus on hybridity undoes many of the binary oppositions marking previous translation theory; it relates translation to the demographical movements that are changing the shape of our cultures; it can generally operate within all the critiques ensuing from the uncertainty paradigm.

Those are not minor virtues. The existence of “cultural translation” as a paradigm is nevertheless illustrated by the many places in which others do not see the point, or do not accept its redefinitions of basic terms. The following arguments are part and parcel of its emergence as a paradigm among paradigms.

8.8.1 “These theories only use translation as a metaphor”

Many of the theorists cited here freely recognize that they are using the term “translation” in a metaphorical way. They are drawing ideas from one area of experience (the things that translators do) to a number of other areas (the ways cultures interrelate). This can be productive and stimulating for both the fields involved. On the other hand, the generalized production of metaphors risks expanding the term “translation” until it becomes meaningless (Duarte 2005), or indeed of losing track of the original referent. Michaela Wolf points out the risk of developing “a sociology of translation without translation” (2007: 27).

It would be dangerous, though, to defend any original or true sense of the word “translation.” Is there anything really wrong with the metaphors? Is there anything new in their workings? After all, metaphors always map one area of experience onto another, and when you think about it, the words we use in European languages for the activities of translators (“translation,” “Übersetzen,” etc.) are no less metaphorical, since they propose images of movement across space (more than time) (see D’hulst 1992). Perhaps the problem is that they have become dead metaphors, images that we somehow accept as self-evident truths. The more conscious metaphors in “cultural translation” might help us think more critically about all kinds of translation.

8.8.2 “Cultural translation is an excuse for intellectual wandering”

Here I translate **Antoine Berman**'s term “vagabondage conceptuel” (1985/1999: 21), which he used as a complaint about the proliferation of metaphors and “generalized translation” he found in George Steiner and Michel Serres. Berman recognizes that translations will always produce cultural change, and there will thus always be the temptation to associate change with translation. However, he warns against the view where everything can translate everything else, where there is “universal translatability.” To oppose this, indeed to oppose excessive theorizing, he argues for a concept of “restrained translation” that respects the letter of the foreign text (cf. Godard 2002).

Berman nevertheless does not seem to account for the many theorists of cultural translation who emphasize *untranslatability*, resistance, and maintenance of foreignness in

all processes of translation. That is, many would agree with his politics, but not with his strategy. Indeed, many would accept “intellectual wandering” as a compliment—was not Greek truth, *aletheia*, supposed to be “divine wandering”?

8.8.3 “Cultural translation is a space for weak interdisciplinarity”

Associated with criticism of “generalized translation” is the suspicion that the scholars dealing with cultural translation do not know anything about interlingual translation, or are not interested in it. From this perspective, the various theorists would be stealing the notion of translation, without due appreciation of any of the other paradigms of translation theory. Wolf (2009: 77–8) retorts:

the question arises “who is the owner of the translation term?” I argue that banning a metaphorical variant of the translation notion—i.e. what has been called “cultural translation”—from the field of research of Translation Studies would ultimately mean rejecting any sort of interdisciplinary work in this respect.

Can any discipline own a word? Obviously not. Can it attempt to stop others using the word? It is difficult to see how. Yet there is an obvious question here: Why should we work with other theorists simply because they use the same word as us? If you are producing a theory of forks as tools for eating, would you have to work in an interdisciplinary way with experts in “forks in the road” or “tuning forks” or “fork” as a situation in chess? The analogy is perhaps not as far-fetched as it sounds.

One kind of solution here can be found in the difference between a word (“translation”) and a term (“translation” plus a set of defining characteristics, such as the ones mentioned in 5.4 above). If a term is defined precisely, as a conceptual tool for working on a particular problem, then perhaps it can indeed be owned by a discipline. Of course, no one can then stop other disciplines from using words any way they want.

Wolf’s second argument is that if we do not accept this **interdisciplinarity**, then we must refuse all interdisciplinarity. This is the kind of argument reminiscent of binary political activists: “If you are not with us, you are against us.” There seems to be no reason why translation scholars might choose to work with some disciplines (perhaps Sociology, Cognitive Science, or Linguistics) and not others (Cultural Studies, Philosophy, or Psychoanalysis), as long as the cooperation is suited to the problem being worked on.

8.8.4 “Cultural translation can be studied entirely in English”

Once the term “translation” loses the interlingual element of its definition, it can be studied without reference to different languages. In fact, everything can be studied within the major languages, often just within English (or French, or German): as we have seen, Homi Bhabha was writing as a professor of English about a novel in English. The result is a paradoxical eclipse of alterity, as noted by Harish Trivedi: “Rather than help us encounter and experience other cultures, translation would have been assimilated in just one monolingual global culture” (2007: 286). This critique fits in with Berman’s fear of “global translatability,” and indeed with a mode of theorization where the model “postmodern society” somehow fits all

societies, and the one kind of “translation correctly understood” (after reading Walter Benjamin, in English) accounts for all translation. The theories of cultural translation could be sweeping away the very otherness they claim to espouse.

8.8.5 “Cultural translation is not in touch with the translation profession”

This is a version of a general reproach made of translation theory: the people who theorize do not actually know how to translate, so they do not really know about translation. The criticism might be more acute in the case of “cultural translation” since these theorists are talking about much more than translations as texts, and there is the associated argument that they are more interested in their power in the academy than in anything to do with other minority cultures. I have noted that there is very little concern for actual translators (Rushdie’s translators took the bullets for him, while Bhabha calmly declares that Rushdie’s resistance is “untranslatable”) and one might more generally lament that the dynamics of cultures swamp any focus on specific “translation cultures” or “professional intercultural.” In a sense, the paradigm is too powerful to empower translators in any clear way.

On the other hand, some theorists are indeed translators, and very innovative ones at that (Spivak, certainly, and Venuti), and most of the others live and work across multiple cultures. They are not unaware of the kinds of situations in which translators work. More promisingly, the connection with migration helps us consider the many new translation situations, with a focus on “social needs” rather than market demands. There is no theoretical reason why the paradigm of cultural translation should exclude a closer focus on translators.

The above are real arguments, of significance for the future of translation theory. Some of them are profound enough to threaten any attempt to see cultural translation as a coherent paradigm; others are debates that ensure the dynamism and contemporary relevance of the paradigm. You might run through them and keep a scorecard of good and bad points. On balance, for me, the virtues of cultural translation merit serious attention.

SUMMARY

This chapter started from a reading of the way Homi Bhabha uses the term “cultural translation” in his chapter “How Newness Enters the World.” I have then questioned how new the concept really is. I have reviewed earlier calls for a wider discipline, particularly in Jakobson and Even-Zohar, and how the term “cultural translation” developed from social anthropology. The wider view can also draw on actor-network theory (translation sociology) and German-language work on communication between different cultural groups in complex societies, particularly in contexts involving immigration. If something new has entered the world of translation, it is probably from the migrations and changes in communication patterns, to the extent that we can no longer assume separate languages and cultures. The social and cultural spaces that once set up equivalence theory are no longer there. Cultural translation might thus offer ways of thinking about the many situations in which translation now operates in the world.

SOURCES AND FURTHER READING

The third edition of *The Translation Studies Reader* (Venuti 2012) includes texts by Berman, Spivak, Appiah, and Derrida (although the last-mentioned is not highly representative of Derrida's uses of translation). Munday (2012) touches on this paradigm in three separate chapters, somehow distinguishing between culture, ideology, sociology, and philosophy. Homi Bhabha should be basic reading for anyone interested in cultural translation. Where you go from there depends very much on what you want to work on. The volume *Nation, Language, and the Ethics of Translation*, edited by Bermann and Wood (2005), gives samples of the work being done in the United States. Many of the more international strands are being brought together in the Routledge journal *Translation Studies*.

Suggested projects and activities

- 1 Do a web search for the term "cultural translation." How many different meanings can you find? Would they all fit into the one paradigm?
- 2 If a novel by Salman Rushdie can be considered an act of cultural translation because of its active use of hybridity, could the same be said of most novels? Are there any non-translational uses of language?
- 3 Consider the statement that "the language of the Americas is translation." Could the same be true of all languages? (Is there any language that has not been displaced?) How many different natural languages are spoken in the Americas? How many have died? What could be the ideological effect of saying that they are all really the one language? For that matter, who said that "the language of Europe is translation"?
- 4 Even-Zohar wants "transfer studies" to look at the movements from culture to culture of basic technologies like the horse or the alphabet. Should such things be considered by translation theory?
- 5 Locate one of Spivak's translations of Mahasweta Devi (or any literary translation that has a substantial preface by the translator). How does the translator describe the start languages for the translation processes? How many start languages are there in the content of the text (i.e. what languages are the ideas coming from)? Are the start texts assumed to be more authentic than the translations? Can the start texts be seen as translations?
- 6 Callon and Latour see translation as an act where someone speaks on behalf of someone else, making themselves indispensable and thus accruing power. Is this the case of all translations? Could it be the case of the relation between Bhabha and Rushdie, or Spivak and Devi?
- 7 Emily Apter is an American Professor of Comparative Literature and French who associates translation theory with a "new Comparative Literature" (2006). In doing so, she acknowledges the following "pioneers in the field of translation studies": "George Steiner, André Lefevere, Antoine Berman, Gregory Rabassa, Lawrence Venuti, Jill Levine, Michel Heim, Henri Meschonnic, Susan Sontag, Richard Howell, and Richard Sieburth" (2006: 6). Who are all these

people? What do they have in common? Why have so few of them been mentioned in this book?

- 8 Go to the website of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies (eipcp) and look up its various publications and activities involving “cultural translation.” Now, what kind of translation has produced this superb multilingual website? What is the relation between what the authors say about translation and the way they use translations? What language does the siglum “eipcp” make sense in? Why are there so few references to the “pioneers” mentioned by Apter?
- 9 Can translation be studied by looking at one language only? Should it be studied by people who know only one language?
- 10 In 1928, in full Surrealist swing, the Brazilian poet Oswald de Andrade proclaimed his *Manifesto antropófago* for Brazilian culture. Here is a taste:

Only Cannibalism unites us. Socially. Economically. Philosophically.
 The only law of the world. Masked expression of all individualisms, of all collectivism. Of all religions. Of all peace treaties.
 Tupi, or not tupi that is the question.
 Against all catechisms. And against the mother of the Gracchus brothers.
 I am only interested in that which is not mine. Law of the human. Law of the cannibal.

(Andrade 1928/1980: 81; my translation)

In 1978 the Brazilian poet Augusto de Campos applied this to translation, listing his favorite foreign poets and declaring, “[m]y way of loving them is to translate them. Or to swallow them down, in accordance with Oswald de Andrade’s Cannibal Law: I am only interested in that which is not mine” (1978: 7; my translation).

Compare these statements with the inner/outer dynamic described by Spivak. Are they talking about the same kind of translation? Now compare it with the guilt described by Spivak, or with the power of “speaking on behalf of” mentioned by Callon and Latour. Do the degrees of guilt or power depend on the directionality of the translation? Do they have anything to do with your own experience when translating?

- 11 Compare the statements by Andrade and Campos with the accounts of post-colonial cannibalism theory in Vieira (1999) or Gentzler (2008). Do the above statements actually present a translation theory? Do the commentaries by Vieira or Gentzler present much more evidence than the above? Have the commentaries somehow constructed a whole school of thought (cf. Milton and Bandia 2008: 12)?
- 12 Look for information on the translation services (not) provided for immigrants in your country. Are immigrants obliged to become translators themselves? What role do children play? What is the position of women with respect to the various languages? Are these problems and forms of translation addressed by any other paradigm of translation theory?